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TI SGOOD to have this opportunity to discuss
with you some of my vie\vs regarding the inflation
which has plagued our economy for the past five or
six years. It seems important to me that all of us
understand current economic stabilization problems
and the efforts of our public officials to handle them.
If our economy is ever to contain inflation, we must
have leaders who are aware of the causes of inflation,
of its costs to our society, and of the difficulties
inherent in reducing inflation once it is allowed to
run rampant.
Since late 1964 prices have been rising with increas-
ing rapidity, with effective attempts to control this
situation only in the last two years. Now that we
have undergone for several years our worst inflation
since World War II, it is timely to reflect on this
experience and to draw some conclusions. If the
obvious lessons of the last six years are remembered
in the future, the likelihood of repeating unnecessary
mistakes should be reduced considerably. Only by
avoiding such mistakes can our economy experience
economic growth at a high level of emnployuent with
a reasonable stable price level. These, of course, are
widely accepted national economic goals.
The Current Inflation
Before going to the main part of my remarks, let
me review the course of the present inflation and
steps we have taken to curb it, Our economy had a
period of substantial price stability from 1958 to 1964.
During this period the wholesale price index was
virtually unchanged, the consumer price index rose
about one per cent a year, and the GNP price de-
flator rose at only a slightly faster rate than con-
sumer prices. Those six years of relatively stable prices
marked the end of the inflation generated during
World War II and the Korean War. By 1964 we had
achieved a high level of resource utilization, and
prospects were good for continuing price stability.
Our economy was moving into a period when it could
be said that the goals of economic stabilization had
been essentially achieved,
But, then, from 1964 to just recently, an era of
ever more rapidly increasing prices developed. This
inflation was caused by growth of total spending for
goods and services at an eight per cent annual rate
from 1964 to 1968, or about txviee as rapid as our
economy’s ability to increase the production of goods
and services. This excessive expansion in total spend-
ing was fostered by very stiniulative monetary actions
of the Federal Reserve System, supported by the Ad-
ministration, the Congress, and public opinion. The
nation’s money stock, except for a brief interlude in
1966, rose at rates which approximated those prevail-
ing during the World War II and the Korean W~ar
inflations.
One of the main reasons for such extremely high
rates of monetary growth appears to have been a de-
cision to expand welfare programs and the Vietnam
War simultaneously and to finance these increases, in
large part, by inflating the nionetary system rather
than exclusively by taxes or borrowing from the
planned saving of the public. Theselatter two sources
of Government finance are basically noninflationary,
because most of an increase in Government expendi-
tures is then made at the expense of private expendi-
tures.° On the other hand, when increased Govern-
mnent expenditures are accompanied by excessive
monetary expansion, there is little, if any, direct reduc-
tion in private spending. In fact, there are strong
secondary repercussions from such a method of Gov-
ernment finance which greatly enlarge spending by
business firms and consumers.
eFor further elaboration of this point, see “The ‘Crowding
Out’ of Private Expenditures by Fiscal Policy Actions,” on
pages 12-24 of this Review.
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Significant actions to curb inflation, either fiscal or
monetary, were delayed well into 196$, despite
acknowledgment of the existence of a serious inflation
and often-expressed desires to do something about it.
Then, in mid-1968 a program of reducing the rate of
increase in Governmnentspending and increasing taxes
was adopted with a view to bringing the excessive
rate of growth in total spending more into line with
growth in potential output of goods and services.
However, it ~v as not until the rate of growth in the
money stock was reduced markedly in 1969 that the
stage was set to bring total spending more in line
with growth in our economy’s productive potential.
Curbing such a long inflation has proven, once
again, to he both slow and costly. Only in recent
months has there been any evidence of a slowing in
the rate of price increase, and the period is still too
short to conclude definitely that there has been a
marked waning of inflation. Ia mconfident, though,
that if monetary growth is limited to a moderate rate
for the next several months, there will be significant,
but slow, abatement of inflation. On the cost side of
setting the stage for reducimig inflation, there has been
a slowdown in output of goods and ser-vices accom-
panied by a rise in unemployment. It should be
pointed out, hosvever, that the present slowdown has
been much less than during any of the other such
slowdowns during the past t\venty-five years.
Some Lessons
I turn now to the main theme of this discussion —
some lessons to be learned from the present inflation.
In developing these lessons, I \vill point up some of
the failures of commonly accepted economic ideas
regarding economic stabilization which have been in-
strumental in permitting our present inflation to de-
velop. By the commonly accepted economic ideas, I
mean the formn of analysis taught in the majority of
undergraduate economies courses for the past twenty-
five years. Although most economists have now ad-
vanced beyond this rather limited analysis, it still per-
mneates the thinking of the general public, mnany busi-
ness and financial leaders, news writers, politicians,
and public policymakers.
inflation a Monetary Phenomenon
One lesson, and I believe the most impomiant, is that
inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, where-
as the conventional vie\v has placed great stress on
Government deficits, union power, and business
monopolies as causes of inflation. There is now con-
siderable evidence from studies at our Bank and
by others that the excessive total spending which led
to a high and accelerating rate of price advance was
generated, for the most part, during 1964 to 1968 by
the exceedingly high rate of monetary expansion of
that period.
As I pointed out earlier, rapid grosvth in Govern-
ment spending and deficits is not a major source of
inflation unless accommodated by growth in the money
stock. Likewise, upward pressures on prices from
union or business monopoly actions are not likely to
initiate a period of inflation unless accompanied by
rapidly rising total spending. Such a rise in total
spending requires expansive actions on the part of
monetary authorities. Thus, the price level effect of
often mentioned fiscal and mormopoly causes of infla-
tion can be contained if they are not validated by
monetary actions \vhich generate a rapid growth in
total spending.
Popular Economic Analysis madequate
Another lesson to be learned from our recent in-
flation is that the popular economic analysis of the
past quarter century has been ill-equipped to correct
inflation. A major aspect of this conventional analysis,
as I mentioned earlier, is that the general. price level
is believed to be only remotely influenced by mone-
tary actions. Instead, in addition to fiscal actions, con-
siderable emphasis is given to controlling undesired
price level movemnents by measures to reduce monop-
oly po\ver or by exertion of Govermuent pressure, such
as guidelines, to induce those who set prices to act in
a manner consistent \vith national objectives. This
view, which was developed in large part from the
experience of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, is
still prevalent in the economic theory which underlies
much of popular thought regarding economic stabili-
zation. By being developed rvithin such a depression
orientation, this body of theory is not particularly
useful, in my opinion, in developing programs to cope
with an inflationary situation such as we have ex-
perienced since 1964. Also, reliance on such devices
as the wage-price guidelines during the 1960’s became
a substitute for sound stabilization policy, and thereby,
contributed to the emergence of inflation,
Roles of Monetary and Fiscal Actions
A further lesson from our experience of recent
years is that monetary actions rather than fiscal
actions should be given the major role for stabilizing
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the economy. Until recently, fiscal actions in the formn
of Government spending and taxing programs have
been given the main emphasis in economic stabiliza-
tion efforts to the virtual exclusion of monetary ac-
tions, Such a development was an outgrowth of con-
ventional economics, which for the past thirtv-fi\-e
years has taught that Federal Reserve actions exer-
cise little influence on total demand for goods and
services. According to this conventional thought,
changes in the money stock bring about changes in
market interest rates, while total demand is little
influenced by interest rate movements. Consequentiy,
monetary actions have been thought to be of little
use in any program of economic stabilization, On the
other hand, increased Government expenditures are
viewed as adding directly to total demand, and tax
reductions are thought to add to disposable income
which subsequently is nsed to purchase goods and
services. Consequently, this view has argued that
fiscal actions have an immediate and powerful
influence on total spending.
This conventional analysis, possibly because of its
simplicity which helps in the teaching of under-
graduate economics, has received wide acceptance as
evidenced in discussions of economic stabilization by
the general public, in the press, in the Congress,
and even in some of the Reports of the Council of
Economic Advisers during the mid-l960’s. It should
be pointed out that this vie\v of the influence of
fiscal actions does not take into consideration the
importance of choice among the three alternative
means of financing Government expenditures — taxes,
borrowing from the public, and monetary expansion.
At the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank we have
reported several studies regarding the relative im-
portance of monetary and fiscal actions for economic
stabilization. Our empirical studies for the United
States economy from 1919 to 1969 and for several
foreign countries in the post-World War II period
support the view that monetary actions, measnred by
changes in the money stock, should receive the main
emphasis in economic stabilization, not fiscal actions,
The accelerating inflation of the last half of the
1960’s can be attributed, in large part to the great
emphasis given to fiscal actions and the downgrading
of monetary influence . Monetary authorities did not
reduce the rapid rate of monetary expansion dum-mng
a large part of that period because there was a desire
to let fiscal actions curb inflation and a belief by
some that only fiscal actions would be effective. Then,
when restrictive fiscal actions \vere taken in mid-1968
— the surtax and slower increases in Government
spe.nding — many e.conomists, on the basis of preva-
lent theories, predicted “fiscal over-kill” by early 1969.
In response to such predictions, nionetary authorities
e.ngage.d in even •mnore e.xpans~onaryactions in the last
half of 1969. Continuation of accelerating inflation
after fiscal actions had been expected to provnme a
quick cooling of the inflationary fires should burn
firmly into our mncmor~esthe lesson that monctarv
actions are more effective than fiscal actions in
promoting economnic stability,
But Id onot want tlmere to he any rmnsunderstandrng
regarding our view concerning fiscal actions. Some
have interpreted us as saying that Governmmment spend-
ing and taxing have no influence on the course of the
economy, hut this is not the case. Our research indi-
cates that accelerations and decelerations in the rate
of increase in Government spending, even if there
is no accomnmodating change in money, cause cor-
responding short-run changes in total spending. Also,
financing of large Government deficits has in the past
caused the Federal Reserve to expand the money
stock at excessive. rate.s. This was one. reason for rapid
monetary growth in 1967 and 196$ . Finally, Govern-
ment spending and taxing programns, insofar as they
affect the amount of resources allocated to private
investment and to Government outlays of a simnilar
nature, mnay have a significant i.nfi.nence on long-mn
economic growth.
implementation of Monetary Policy
An additional le.sson we. have learned fromn our pres-
ent in.flation is that the usual method of canying out
monetary policy in the 1950’s and 1960’s was faulty.
Although stated monetary policy was to control infla-
tion, the method used for implementing this policy
actually contributed to the inflation rather than to its
control.
Discretionary monetary policy was reinstated in
1951, after its suspension during World War II and
up through the early part of the Korean War. The pur-
pose of the 1951 change was to permit monetan’
authorities to fight the inflation of the Korean War.
In conducting its monetary policy responsibilities since
then, the Federal Dpen Market Committee until very
recently has relied largely on measures of money
market conditions as guides to its operations. Ia m
sure that most of you are familiar with the view that
falling interest rates or rising free reserves indicate
easy monetary actions, whii.e tight actions are indi-
cated by rising interest rates or falling free reserves.
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Such a view was in general agreement with the
\vide.ly heM belie.f that monetary actions work pri-
marily through changes in market interest rates. It
also was in agreement wrth the view that the Federal
Reserve has great ability to “set” market interest
rate.s, Recent research and experience, however, have
tended to reject these propositions. For example,
rapid monetary e.xpansion, such as in 1967 and 1968,
stimulate.s total spending and thereby generates rap-
idly growing demand for cre.dit and rising interest
rates,
By using marke.t interest rates to indicate the thrust
of monetarv actions, many public pol~cymakerscon-
cluded that despite very rapid monetary growth,
rising interest rates were eviuence of monetamy re-
straint during 1967 and 1968. In fact, there was a
belief by mnany that the extent of the increase in
rnarkct interest rates was too great because of the
dislocations which occurred in the savings and hous-
ing industries. There was a desire to hold back the
extent of interest rate increases, hut attemnpts to do so
required injections of hank reserves which contributed
to a rapid growth in the money stock, This, in turn,
fostered excessive total dlemand and fed further the
fires of inflation. In retrospect. it is rmow apparent that
the traditional reliance on such measures of money
market conditions as market interest rates contributed
to ommr present inflation.
Sound economic stabilization requires guides to
the thrust of monetary actions other than money
market conditions. Recent experience demonstrates
that use of a monetary aggregate, such as the money
stock, would have produced far better results than we
got during the last half of the 1960’s. Excessive total
spending followed the very rapid rates of monetary
expansion from ea’l 1965 to early 1966 and during
1967 and 1968. But when money ceased to grow in
the last eight months of 1966 and grew only slowly
in 1969, total spending slo\ved markedly after a short
lag. Conclusions I have advanced from this casual
analysis have been supported bya growing body of
empirmcal research.
importance of Price An.ticipaPotts
A fur-titer lesson concerns the importance. of price
anticipations in the inflationary process and in the
curbing of inflatior.As I mentioned earlier, much of
economic theory upon wInch recommendations for
stabilization actions during time 1960’s rested did not
give adequate eonside’m’ation to the basic forces in-
fluencing the price level. Little consideration was
g~ven to the well-lmown fact that consumnem’s, business-
men and labor unions do take into consideration
anticipated pricelevel changes when making decisions
to purchase goods and services in the present and
when negotiating contmaets for the future. Once
gron’tb of total demand exceeds growth of potential
output and inflation has been underway for a period
of time, these decision—makers tend to extrapolate
the past trend of prices into the future in an attempt
to protect their positions from the ravages of inflation.
This process provides a momentum to inflation
which causes prices to continue to rise. This infla-
tionary momentum may carry on well after public
policy steps have been taken to bring total demnand
growth into line with potential output growth. Such
a development has been seen in recent experience in
which, after a year or so of reduced rate of growth
of total spending, the price level has continued to
rise, rapidly.
Another manifestation of inflationary expectations
during the past several years has appeared in financial
markets. There is a considerable body of economic
theory which holds that market interest rates are
greatly influenced by expected price level movements.
This proposition was not incorporated into the con-
ventional theory underlying stabilization efforts of the
1960’s. We who maintain that market interest rate
movements reflect inflationary expectations argue that
when prices are expected to rise, borrowers are willing
to pay higher interest rates because they will pay
back with depreciated dollars. In addition, any delay
in making purchases using borrowed funds will result
in high costs in the future. We also argue that lenders
will ask for higher interest rates in order to protect
the purchasing power of their funds. Thus, both de-
mand and supply forces during a period of inflation
lead to higher and higher interest rates.
Many who followed conventional views were at a
loss to explain the marked rise in interest rates from
1965 to 1968 at a time when the money stock was
rising rapidly. At the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank
we have reported empirical evidence that inflation
caused almnost all of this increase in market interest
rates. The recent experience demonstrates that rapid
monetary expansion produces high, not low, interest
rates. The truth is the reverse of conventional wisdom
regarding interest rate movements.
This lesson leads to the conclusion that the theo-
retical foundation of economic stabilization must give
adequate recognition to the pervasive influence of
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price level expectations. Not to do so, would be to
repeat the mistakes of the past. I believe that this
lesson has already shown up in the expressed views
of many policymakers, hut there has been little evi-
dence that it has been learned by the general public,
by the Congress, or by economic commentators in
the news media and market ne\vs letters.
Regulation Q and Control of inflation
Another lesson from the recent experience is that
ceilings on interest rates paid by commercial banks
on time deposits, set by the Federal Reserve under
Regulation Q, are not an effective device for slowing
growth in total spending, as mnany maintained in the
late 1.960’s. Instead, such ceilings merely create in-
efficiencies in our financial markets. Commercial bank-
ers are xvell aware of the reehanneling of loan funds
away from banks mmd into such markets as the one
for commercial paper when free market interest rates
exceed Regulation Q ceiling rates,
Some have argued that since banks can make fewer
loans under such circumstances, total spending will be
restrained. The fact of the matter is that while spend-
ing by potential bank borrowers nray be reduced,
spending by those who have access to the money
markets \vili rise by about the same amount. As a
result, total spending is little affected by manipulation
of Regulation Q interest rate ceilings.
These ceiling rates on time deposits, however, have
led to inefficiencies in the flow of funds and in utiliza-
tion of real resources in recent years. As a result of
Q, customary movements of loan funds from one
corporation to another through commercial hank
channels flow instead through the more direct com-
mercial paper market or through tIme less direct and
less efficient Euro-dollar mnarket. Such reehanneling
of loan funds reduces the size of the commercial bank-
ing system relative to the total market for funds, a
process which is not essential for stabilization policy.
Other interest rate ceihngs, including state usury laws
and ceilings set on funds raised by savings and loan
associations and mutual savings banks, also lead to
less efficient channeling of funds and use of resources.
Costs of Adjusting to Inflation
Another lesson from recent experience is that there
are great costs of adjusting to accelerating inflation.
Everyone is familiar with such losses from inflation as
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reduced purchasing power of fixed income groups and
of holders of wealth in tire fonn of fixed money claims.
It is true that if inflation is anticipated correctly, a
large number of individuals can adjust their contracts
and wealth holdings so as to avoid most of the effects
of rising prices. And, in recent years Congress has
kept Social Security benefits more or less abreast of
the price increase, thereby helping to maintain the
purchasing po\ver of a large number of retired
persons.
However, when the rate of inflation is changing
rapidly, and holders of wealth attempt to adjust their
holdings, there are losses in addition to that from
reduced purchasing power. For example, the great
drop in the bond market during our present inflation
and the recent bear stock market are partly a con-
sequence of attempts of investors to adjust to ac-
celerating inflation. This recent experience demon-
strates that even the stock market may not be a very
good hedge against inflation when the rate of price
advance is accelerating.
There are also considerable losses to the whole
economy resulting from the adjushnent process which
accompanies accelerations in the rate of price advance.
Inefficiencies develop in product, resource, and finan-
cial markets in the process of adjusting prices and
contracts to rising prices. Normal business transac-
tions become more difficult. For instance, we have
reports that some business firms in recent years quoted
list prices only on a day-to-day basis. Their salesmen
were required to contact the home office before any
price could be quoted. Labor contract negotiations
become more difficult to settle. In financial markets
investors have to pay greater attention to ascertaining
the impact of inflation on their portfolios and on
alternative outlets for their funds.
Costs of C’urbing Inflation
A final lesson is that curbing a rapid, prolonged
and accelerating inflation is a slow and difficult proc-
ess, and is not without considerable costs. As I
mentioned earlier, anticipations of price increases
provide a powerful momentum to inflation. Such an-
ticipations respond slowly to actual price movements
and are not reduced until the rate of inflation has
actually subsided for some time. As a result of this
slow process of reducing anticipated rates of price
increase, the general price level continues to rise
rapidly for some time after restraint is applied to
growth in total spending.
IFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS
Many have been surprised and disappointed that
restraint of the past two years has not produced
greater results in terms of the pm-ice level. Some have
even expressed despair at ever seeing relative price
stability again. It should be pointed out, however,
that inflation was pemmitted to develop for almost
five years before effective restraint was applied. By
then, inflation was moving along under its own mo-
mentum, and only moderate restraint was applied. It
should, therefore, not be surprising that five years of
inflation cannot he eliminated in a short period of
time. Moreover, it should be remembered that the
inflations of World War II and the Korean War were
not curbed until the late 1950’s and that much greater
restraint was applied in that effort,
There is also considerable cost in eliminating infla-
tion. With restricted growth in total spending and
with prices continuing to rise for some time, output
of goods and services stagnates or is reduced. As a
consequence, there is a loss of jobs and income to
many individuals and a loss of goods and services to
the \vhole of our society. Labor strife is accentuated,
as we now see, when unions attempt to catch up
with inflation and to anticipate further inflation at a
time of declining corporate profits.
Conclusions
Let me now draw a few general conclusions from
this discussion of our recent experience. Inflation, be-
cause of the many problems and costs it creates,
should never be permitted to start. This may seem
obvious and trivial, but many have argued that these
costs are small compared to alleged large gains flow-
ing from a high level of employment. Our research
indicates, however, that inflation is not required for
our economy to have a high level of employment.
Another conclusion is that the main body of eco-
nomic thought of the l950’s and the 1960’s has not
proven very useful in handling economic stabilization
problems. In fact, there is considerable evidence that
reliance on this body of thought contributed greatly
to the present inflation — both as a cause of rapid
price level advances and as a hindrance to their
control.
Finally, monetary policy has a major responsibility
for promoting price level stability. If such policy is
to be applied in an effective manner, the public, the
Congress, the Administration, and the Federal Re-
serve should reflect on the lessons to be learned from
the experience of the past six years.
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